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COMMENTS
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, THE NLRA,
AND PAROCHIAL SCHOOL TEACHERS
The first amendment to the United States Constitution declares
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. ." I The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 states that the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) "is empowered . . . to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice... affecting com-
merce." 3 When the Board seeks to extend its jurisdiction to include
parochial school teachers, an intriguing constitutional issue is posed
by the potential collision of the first amendment with the NLRA.
Because the fundamental purpose of parochial schools is to unite
the functions of secular and religious education, the pervasive scru-
tiny of labor practices that is permitted by the NLRA may interfere
with the religious rights of parochial school employers and students.
The unitary nature of parochial school education poses the
complex and difficult problem of how to reconcile the first amend-
ment's goal of protecting free exercise with the NLRA's purpose of
permitting the government to regulate labor relations. Courts in
two federal jurisdictions have recently confronted this issue. In
Caulfield v. Hirsch,4 a district judge in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania permanently enjoined the Board from asserting jurisdiction
over the Roman Catholic elementary school teachers of Philadel-
phia. Similarly, in Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce bargaining
orders issued by the Board in cases that emerged from Roman Catho-
lic schools located in Chicago and the South Bend-Fort Wayne area
of Indiana. In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth, Cir-
cuit is presently considering the issue in Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop of Los Angeles v. NLRB.0
The social importance of these cases should not be underesti-
mated. In the Archdiocese of Philadelphia alone, the Board is
' U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
229 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970).
3 Id. § 160(a).
4 No. 76-279 (E.D. Pa., July 7, 1977).
5 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977).
6 No. 77-1286 (9th Cr., appeal docketed Jan. 31, 1977).
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seeking to exercise jurisdiction over 275 Roman Catholic elemen-
tary schools. Denominational schools in this country number in
the tens of thousands with Roman Catholic institutions comprising
the major portion of these schools.7 If the first amendment is inter-
preted to prohibit the Board from exercising jurisdiction over the
parochial schools, a large number of teachers may be compelled
simply to accept the terms and conditions that religious employers
offer or to look for work elsewhere. On the other hand, if the
NLRA is applied to the parochial schools, they may face the govern-
ment's scrutiny in areas that implicate sensitive doctrinal and moral
attitudes." The stakes on both sides of the issue are substantial.
Tht thesis of this Comment is that the first amendment bars the
Board from extending its jurisdiction to parochial schools. This
conclusion is reached through the application of a three step con-
stitutional analysis. It is determined that: 1) the activities of the
parochial schools constitute the practice of a legitimate religious
belief that is protected by the free exercise clause; 2) application
of the Board's usual rules would deny the parochial schools the free
exercise of a legitimate religious belief; 3) the denial of free exercise
is not justified by a compelling state interest.9 In order to explain
this conclusion, this Comment will first discuss the cases that have
decided the issue. Second, the possibility will be examined that the
constitutional issue reached in the cases might be avoided. Third,
the constitutional issue will be considered in light of the three-step
test described above; particular emphasis will be placed on the free
exercise problems that are posed by the application of sections
8(a) (1), 8 (a)(3), 8(a)(5) and 9(b) 10 of the NLRA to the parochial
schools.
7 PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON NoNpuBrc EDUCATION, FiNAL REPOnT 5-6, 15-19
(1972), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 16141 and Other Proposals Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 118-19, 127-31 (1972). The
presidential panel noted that there were over 18,000 elementary and secondary
parochial schools, including over 12,000 Roman Catholic schools. A total of 5.2
million children attended parochial schools with 82%, or 4.37 million, attending
Roman Catholic schools.
8 The parochial schools may also face accelerating costs and greater difficulty
in operating if the NLRA is applied to them. Should the parochial schools be
forced to close, the impact on the public school system would be severe; this
adverse impact has been publicized in conjunction with the parochial school aid
cases and needs no further elaboration here. See Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 815-20 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
9 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).




A. The Board's Jurisdictional Test
Although the Board has not ignored first amendment rights in
asserting jurisdiction over religious schools, the jurisdictional test
that it has evolved is of dubious value in deciding the constitutional
issues inherent in such an extension of jurisdiction. The test first
appeared in May 1974, when two cases involving Jewish educational
associations came before the Board. In declining to exercise juris-
diction over an employer that provided religious training in more
than forty synagogues in the Washington, D.C. area, the Board said:
[W]e find that the Employer is a non-profit religiously
orientated institution whose activities are noncommercial
in nature and are intimately connected with the religious
activities of that institution. We did not intend [in ex-
tending jurisdiction to private, non-profit schools] to adopt
a policy of asserting jurisdiction over institutions primarily
religious and non-commercial in character and purpose,
whose educational endeavors are limited essentially to
furthering and nurturing their religious beliefs.'1
In the other case, the Board affirmed without discussion the con-
clusion of an administrative law judge that the purposes of the
NLRA would not be effectuated by asserting jurisdiction over a
Detroit employer that operated a Jewish college, after-school reli-
gious classes at the elementary and secondary level, and pre-school
nursery classes.12
When the Roman Catholic parochial school cases began to arise,
however, the Board was confronted with a much broader educa-
tional effort. Whereas the Jewish employers in the above two cases
supplemented public schooling with religious studies, the Roman
Catholic schools were a substitute for public school education in
its entirety. The Board first extended its jurisdiction to a Catholic
school system in the case of the Henry M. Hald High School Associa-
tion, which operated high schools in the Archdiocese of Brooklyn.13
11 Board of Jewish Educ. of Greater Washington, D.C., 210 N.L.R.B. 1037,
1037 (1974). The Board brought private nonprofit colleges and universities under
its jurisdiction in Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
12 Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053
(1974). Board Member Fanning dissented in this case, asserting that the employer's
sectarian purpose was an inadequate justification for denying jurisdiction and that
the schools' impact on commerce was sufficiently substantial to warrant the assertion
of jurisdiction. Id. 1054.
'3 Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, The Sisters of St. Joseph, 213 N.L.R.B.
415 (1974).,
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Significantly, the Board did not need to face the first amendment
issue in the Hald Association case. An administrative law judge had
addressed the issue, stating in relevant part:
Neither the Act nor the United States Constitution de-
clares that lay teachers must surrender Sec. 7 rights if they
become employed by a religious institution. Indeed Sec. 7
rights, which are now a part of our national heritage estab-
lished by Congress, were a legitimate exercise of Congress'
constitutional power. . . . Any entanglement between the
Hald Association and the government which is manifested
in this case was caused by the Hald Association when it
hired lay teachers and . . .brought itself under the juris-
diction of the Act.14
Remarkably, there was no objection to this finding and the Board
proceeded to assert that "[i]n the absence of exceptions thereto we
accept pro forma the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that
the operations of the Respondent affect commerce . . . and his
conclusion that the Board should assert jurisdiction here." 15 Sub-
sequently, the Board exercised jurisdiction over Roman Catholic
schools in Baltimore, Newark and Hawaii.16 The Board rational-
ized this policy in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore: 17
"The Board's policy in the past has been to decline jurisdiction over
similar [religious] institutions only when they are completely reli-
gious, not just religiously associated, and the Archdiocese concedes
that instruction is not limited to religious subjects." 18
a4 Id. 418 n.7.
15 Id. 415 n.2.
16See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975);
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 204 N.L.R.B. 159 (1973); Roman Catholic
Church in the State of Hawaii, Case No. 37-RC-2081, NLRB Region S37, Honolulu,
Hawaii (filed July 18, 1975).
17216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975).
1s Id. 250. When the Board exercised jurisdiction in Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976), the conflict between the NLRA
and the free exercise clause was addressed: "The provisions of the Act do not
support or interfere with religious beliefs .... Regulation of labor relations does
not violate the First Amendment when it involves a minimal intrusion on religious
conduct and is necessary to [maintain and facilitate the free flow of commerce]."
Id. 1218. The Board cited Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and
The First Church of Christ Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1972), as authority for.
this proposition. In Cantwell, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of several
Jehovah's Witnesses who solicited funds for a religious cause without a permit.
The Court held inter alia that the free exercise clause precludes the state from
deciding what a religious cause is. 310 U.S. at 305-07. The relevance of this
case to the issue facing the Board is obscure, although the opinion did recognize
that religious activities may be regulated to obtain a permissible end as long as the
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The distinction between "completely religious" and "religiously
associated" schools was reiterated by the Board as the basis for its
exercise of jurisdiction over the high schools in Chicago and
Philadelphia. 0 The Seventh Circuit in Catholic Bishop of Chicago
criticized the Board's jurisdictional test because it "provides no
workable guide to the exercise of discretion." 20 The problem with
the test is that its dichotomous nature does not respond to the fact
that many denominational schools are pervasively religious, even
in the instruction of secular subjects.21 Even if the fact that de-
nominational schools teach secular subjects qualified these schools
for treatment as merely religiously associated, the jurisdictional test
begs the constitutional issues that are raised by the conflict between
the dictates of the NLRA and the religious rights of the parochial
school employers. The Board's own test is therefore not helpful in
deciding the constitutional issues, particularly because the Board
contended in Catholic Bishop of Chicago that if the completely reli-
gious/religiously associated distinction were rejected by the court,
it would have to exercise jurisdiction over all denominational
schools.
2 2
B. Judicial Consideration of the Constitutional Issue
The courts in both Caulfield and Catholic Bishop of Chicago
rejected the Board's grounds for asserting jurisdiction and decided
that the Board's extension of regulatory authority to the Roman
Catholic schools was unconstitutional. 23  In Caulfield, the Board re-
jected initial constitutional objections to the Board's jurisdiction
that were presented by five of the Philadelphia elementary school
pastors; a representation election was then ordered by the Board.
2 -
The pastors subsequently sought a preliminary injunction against
the election in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Noting the
serious constitutional objections that were raised against the Board's
jurisdiction, District Judge Van Artsdalen took the unusual step of
limitation does not unduly infringe the free exercise of religion. Id. 306-07. In
First Church, the Board merely held that an activity may be both religious and
commercial, and therefore is not necessarily beyond the Board's jurisdiction. 194
N.L.R.B. at 1008-09. But see text accompanying notes 19-22 infra.
.9Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 177 (1977); Diocese of
Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976); Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975).
20 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1977).
21 See text accompanying notes 53-58 infra.
22559 F.2d at 1123.
23 559 F.2d at 1116-19; No. 76-279, slip op. at 27-28.
24 Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 177 (1977).
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asserting jurisdiction prior to the issuance of a final order by the
Board and granted the motion for a preliminary injunction. 25 The
preliminary injunction was modified by Mr. Justice Brennan, sitting
as Circuit Justice. The full Supreme Court refused to disturb this
action. Under the modification ordered by Justice Brennan, a rep-
resentation election was held and the uncounted ballots were im-
pounded pending resolution of the pastors' lawsuit in the courts.20
In an opinion issued on July 7, 1977, the district court defended
its assumption of subject matter jurisdiction, despite the general
rule that Board representation proceedings are not reviewable.
2 7
The district court went on to join permanently the regional
director's assertion of jurisdiction over the Roman Catholic ele-
mentary schools, holding that application of the NLRA to these
schools violates both the free exercise and the establishment clauses
of the first amendment.28 At the present time, appeals of the dis-
trict court's jurisdictional and constitutional decisions are before
the Third Circuit.
29
In Catholic Bishop of Chicago, constitutional objections to the
Board's jurisdiction were similarly raised and rejected in represen-
tation proceedings. In contrast to the Philadelphia case, however,
the parochial school employers did not seek injunctions in federal
district court. Instead, following the certification of lay teacher
bargaining units in two Chicago high schools and five Indiana di-
ocesan high schools, the employers refused to bargain with the
unions in order to obtain a review of the Board's order in the
federal court of appeals, pursuant to the NLRA.30 Accordingly, the
employers challenged the Board's findings of section 8(a)(1) and
8 (a) (5) violations in the Seventh Circuit. The cases were consoli-
dated on appeal and on August 3, 1977, the Seventh Circuit set
aside the Board orders, finding in the application of the NLRA to
the schools a violation of both religion clauses.31 In Roman Catho-
lic Archbishop of Los Angeles essentially the same procedure was
followed as in the Seventh Circuit cases.
82
2 5 No. 76-279, slip op. at 6-11. But see Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1706 (1977).
2 6 See No. 76-279, slip op. at 5.
27AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409 (1940).
2 8 See No. 76-279, slip op. at 26-35.
2 9 Nos. 77-1318 & 77-1328 (3d Cir., appeal docketed March 7, 1977).
3029 U.S.C. 160(f) (1970).
3' See 559 F.2d at 1124-30.
32 Brief for Appellants at 2-4, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, No.
77-1286 (9th Cir., appeal docketed Jan. 31, 1977).
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The substantive analysis of the courts in both Caulfield and
Catholic Bishop of Chicago was similar in two respects. First, the
Roman Catholic schools under consideration were found to be per-
vasively religious in nature, thereby bringing the employers' claims
squarely under the free exercise clause.33 Second, the Board's exer-
cise of jurisdiction under the NLRA was held to violate the em-
ployers' free exercise rights because the Board's scrutiny of the
employers' labor practices might involve the Board in essentially
doctrinal decisions or, if the Board did not in fact become so en-
tangled, then the potential scrutiny was sufficient to chill the em-
ployers' free exercise rights.34 The two courts, however, parted
company on the formulation of a constitutional test that would
weigh the government's justification for impinging on first amend-
ment rights.
The Caulfield court undertook what it called a sliding scale
analysis, asserting that "[t]he greater the burden on religious activity,
the more compelling the government's interest must be. ... ." 35
In view of the impact on religious freedom resulting from the
Board's broad regulatory authority, the court indicated that the gov-
ernment had not demonstrated sufficiently "grave abuses endanger-
ing paramount federal interests" to justify the extension of the
Board's jurisdiction.3 6 The Seventh Circuit's holding seems to have
relied more upon the establishment clause than the free exercise
clause.3
7
The Board contended that the religious interests of the schools
could be accommodated if the Board deferred to the defense of doc-
trinal justification that might be raised by the employers in response
to an unfair labor practice charge. The Seventh Circuit felt that
such an accommodation doctrine, when combined with the pos-
33 559 F.2d at 1120-22; No. 76-279, slip op. at 18-19.
34 559 F.2d at 1125-27; No. 76-279, slip op. at 30-31.
35 No. 76-279, slip op. at 16.
36 Id. 33.
37 559 F.2d at 1128-30. Because the establishment clause has been held to
erect a "high and impregnable" wall between church and state, see Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), no government interest can be asserted to
justify state action that constitutes establishment, and the formulation of a consti-
tutional standard that weighs the interests of the parties is unnecessary. See, e.g.,
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 402 U.S. 602 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
A kind of balancing is, however, necessarily implicated in the decision regarding
what constitutes an establishment of religion. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality opinion); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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sibilities for Board entanglement in church affairs, would run afoul
of the establishment clause.a8
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases make it clear that the
scope of the Board's authority over parochial schools must be de-
fined, if not by federal district courts, at least by the courts of appeal
under the review provisions of the NLRA. Furthermore, the impor-
tance of the issue makes it likely that the Supreme Court will at
some point consider it. Accordingly, the interesting question of
the district courts' jurisdiction over representation proceedings, al-
though clearly a central issue in cases like Caulfield, will not be dis-
cussed further.39
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
It is a well settled principle of jurisprudence that courts should
avoid deciding constitutional issues if a case can be resolved on a
statutory ground.40 Both the Caulfield court and the Seventh Cir-
cuit ignored the possibility that the parochial school teacher cases
could be disposed of on statutory grounds; instead, both courts
reached the constitutional issue. This decision was based on the
idea that "in passing the ... Act, Congress intended to and did vest
in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally per-
missible under the Commerce Clause." -'1 This perception of the
Act's sweep is a troubling one. The commerce clause was not con-
sidered to be as unlimited at the time of the NLRA's passage as it
is today,42 and there is little doubt that Congress never contemplated
the question of the Act's applicability to parochial schools.
In 1944, the Supreme Court upheld the application of the
Wagner Act to the Polish National Alliance, a fraternal benefit
society.43 The Court held that an organization's effect on interstate
88 559 F.2d at 1128-30.
39 For a discussion of the jurisdictional issue, see Boire v. Greyhound Corp.,
376 U.S. 473 (1964); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
40 U.S. V. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120-121 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
41 NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 29,4, 226 (1963); 559 F.2d at
1115 n.7; No. 76-279, slip op. at 19-20.
42 Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (commerce power
does not extend to the regulation of production workers' relations with employer
because production involves local relations, with indirect impact on interstate com-
merce) with Wickhard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (effect on interstate com-
merce is relevant rather than directness of impact) and Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (commerce power includes the power
to regulate the "local incidents" of interstate commerce).
43 Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
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commerce was the determinative factor in deciding whether the
organization was subject to the Act. 4 The Court stated:
[T]he Board was not unjustified in finding that the unfair
labor practices found by it would affect commerce. And
the undoubted fact that Alliance promotes, among Ameri-
cans of Polish descent, interest in, and devotion to, the
contributions that Poland has made to civilization does not
subordinate its business activities to insignificance.45
Perhaps because the Congress did not wish to override the
Court's interpretation of the Act, the Congress rejected the House
version of the Taft-Hartley Act, which would have excluded from
Taft-Hartley's definition of employer "any corporation, community
chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes." 4
Instead, the Taft-Hartley Act excluded only non-profit hospitals and
government corporations.4 7 Despite this fact, Congress' intent con-
cerning the jurisdictional reach of the Board remained unclear.
The failure to specifically exclude as much as the House wished may
not have been viewed as too threatening given what was then per-
ceived as the limits of the commerce clause. The House Confer-
ence Report stated:
The other non-profit organizations excluded under the
House bill are not specifically excluded in the conference
agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances and in
connection with purely commercial activities of such or-
ganizations have any of the activities of such organizations
or of their employees been considered as affecting com-
merce so as to bring them within the scope of the ... Act.
4s
This language may mean that Congress intended the Board to have
the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible, ex-
44 Id.
45 Id. 648.
40H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEiCs-
LATE HISORY Or TBE LABOR MANAGFMNT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 34 (1948).
Several members of the House Committee on Education and Labor were aware
that a broad exclusion might be incompatible with Polish National Alliance. See
H.R. EP'. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), reprinted in id. at 536.
4729 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
48H.R. RFp. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGIsLATVE HIsToRY oF THE LABOR MmxAcNmrX ACT, 1947, at 536 (1948).
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cepting only those organizations specifically excluded. On the other
hand, it may mean that Congress did not anticipate the extension of
jurisdiction to private school teacher unions in general, or to paro-
chial school teachers in particular. Had Congress anticipated the
extension of the Act to parochial school teachers, it may well have
excluded them out of concern for religious freedom. It would be
possible to conclude, therefore, that Congress may not have in-
tended to extend the Act to parochial schools regardless of whether
it had the constitutional power to do so.
Such an interpretation of the legislative history, however attrac-
tive it might be as a judicial resolution of this problem, would
require a change in the traditional interpretation of the NLRA's
reach. The Supreme Court has long operated under the assump-
tion that Congress went as far as the commerce clause allowed in
passing the NLRA.49  This fact surely justified the Caulfield court
and the Seventh Circuit in treating this issue as a question of con-
stitutional limits, however doubtful Congressional intent may be.
Nonetheless the possibility of a judicial construction of the
statute that would avoid these constitutional questions should not be
dismissed lightly. Although a refusal to interpret the statute as
extending to parochial schools would mark a departure from tradi-
tional construction of the NLRA, the statute's collision with the
constitutional value of free exercise presents a novel situation. It
would not be so striking a departure from past practice for the
Supreme Court to decline to interpret a statute as a challenge to
other, non-commerce related, constitutional principles, absent a clear
statement of such a purpose from Congress.50
49NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963); NLRB v.
Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
5 0 In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the appellants
challenged the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and municipal
employers: "Appellants' essential contention is that the 1974 amendments to the
Act, while undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause, encounter . . .
constitutional barriers because they are to be applied directly to the states and
subdivisions of states as employers." Id. 841. This concern for federalism caused
the Supreme Court to hold that "insofar as the challenged amendments operate to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Con-
gress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3." Id. 852. Cf., e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969) (Marihuana Tax Act, which was propounded under the commerce clause,
found to violate fifth amendment right to due process); McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) in the absence of clear
congressional mandate, the Board could not apply the NLRA to crews of foreign
flag vessels while in American waters because even though the regulation of such




III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
Although the distinction between the free exercise and estab-
lishment clauses has been somewhat blurred in recent cases,51 the
constitutional argument of the parochial schools relies principally
on the free exercise clause. This clause seeks to avoid interference
from the state in religious affairs, while the stablishment clause pro-
hibits the government from supporting any particular religious
group. Because the parochial schools seek to avoid interference
from the federal government in their educational endeavors, this
Comment will treat Caulfield and Catholic Bishop of Chicago as
cases raising free exercise questions. The importance of a free
exercise test in these cases will be evaluated through a consideration
of three questions:
1. Do the educational activities of the parochial schools involve
the practice of a legitimate religious belief?
2. If so, does the application of the NLRA to the parochial
schools deny them the free exercise of their religious belief?
3. If so, may such a denial be justified because it fulfills an
overriding state interest?
52
A. Parochial School Education as the Practice of a Legitimate
Religious Belief
That parochial school education constitutes the practice of a
legitimate religious belief is seldom questioned. The parochial
school employers in Philadelphia introduced a great deal of evi-
dence concerning the thoroughly religious character of their edu-
cational endeavors.5 3 A brief excerpt from the 1972 pastoral letter
51 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
52 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where the Supreme Court
struck down the state convictions of Amish parents who had withdrawn their
children from formal schooling after the eighth grade. The Court employed a three
part analysis in arriving at the conclusion that the parents' free exercise rights had
been infringed:
[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth
grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of
a legitimate religions belief, it must appear either that the State does not
deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there
is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the Free Exercise Clause."
Id. 214.
53 See Brief for Appellees, at 7-12, Caulfield v. Hirsch, No. 77-1318 (3d Cir.,
appeal docketed March 7, 1977).
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on education of the American Bishops To Teach as Jesus Did, is
exemplary.
Catholic education is an expression of the mission en-
trusted by Jesus to the Church he founded.
The Catholic school strives to relate all human culture
eventually to the news of salvation, so that the life of faith
will illumine the knowledge which students gradually gain
of the world, of life, and of mankind. 4
The Supreme Court, moreover, has repeatedly stated in the
parochial aid cases that "the secular education those schools provide
goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason
for the schools' existence. Within the institution, the two are in-
extricably intertwined." 55 The unitary nature of education in
parochial schools was precisely the reason for invalidating public
financial support of such schools except in the most limited of cir-
cumstances. Evidence of the pervasiveness of the parochial schools'
religious purpose, even in secular education, was persuasive to both
Judge Van Artsdalen and the Seventh Circuit and was not seriously
contested by the Board.56
Finally, the activity protected by the Court in Wisconsin v.
Yoder 57 was analogous to the Roman Catholic schools' educational
efforts. The Amish believe that association with secular education
after a certain stage in a person's life is destructive of religious
belief; therefore they seek to educate their children in the essentials
of life at home.58 The alternative educational efforts of the Roman
Catholics are no less religious than those of the Amish. In other
words, the parochial schools are sufficiently religious to meet a con-
stitutional test for a legitimate free exercise claim.
B. The Constitutional Collision Between the Board's Jurisdiction
and the Parochial Schools' Religious Belief
The parochial schools have alleged that the application of the
NLRA to their operations will deny their right of free exercise in
a number of ways. The problem areas vary in both seriousness and
54 Id. at 11.
S5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971).
56 559 F.2d at 1120-22; No. 76-279, slip op. at 18-19.




substance. An analysis of the schools' arguments requires a fairly
detailed analysis of the powers of the Board under the NLRA. The
areas of concern may be grouped as follows:
1. Conflicts arising from the selection and certification of a
bargaining unit under section 9 of the NLRA.
2. Conflicts arising from allegations of unfair labor practices
under section 8.
3. Conflicts of a more general kind arising from entanglement
and the chilling effect of government regulation.
1. Section 9: The certification process
One of the factors that led to the Caulfield court's unusual de-
cision to interrupt the representation proceedings ordered by the
Board was the allegation that the Board was acting unconstitution-
ally merely by asserting jurisdiction in order to determine an ap-
propriate bargaining unit under Section 9(b) of the NLRA.59 The
Board concluded that the appropriate bargaining unit consisted of
all full-time lay teachers in the 275 elementary schools in the Arch-
diocese of Philadelphia. 0 The pastors argued against this deter-
mination on two grounds: the individual elementary schools were
sufficiently autonomous under church law to make it inappropriate
for them to bargain as a unit and the creation of a lay bargaining
unit would cause divisiveness between the lay and religious members
of the faculty."
a. The Choice of a Multi-School Bargaining Unit
The Board has decided that multi-school units are appropriate
in Baltimore, Chicago, Indiana and Los Angeles. 62  In view of the
criteria generally applied by the Board in certification proceedings,6(3
and the usual presumption in favor of single facility bargaining
5929 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
6o Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 177 at 12 (1977).
61 Brief for Appellees, supra note 53, at 7-9, 22-24.
62 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B, 1218
(1976). But see Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 221 N.L.R.B. 831 (1975).
63 The Board usually takes a case by case approach to the issue, considering
variables such as: "(1) prior bargaining history; (2) centralization of management,
particularly in regard to labor relations; (3) extent of employee interchange;
(4) degree of interdependence or autonomy of facilities; (5) difference or similari-
ties in skills and functions of employees and (6) geographical location of facilities
in relation to each other." Tim DEVELOPNG LAson LAw 127 (1971-75 Cum.
Supp. 1976).
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Units,
6 4 these outcomes were by no means certain. In the case of
parochial schools, the Board may have departed from its normal
criteria for certifying a bargaining unit for two reasons. First, the
Board has usually disclaimed jurisdiction over entities that affect
interstate commerce when this impact does not reach a minimum
level, which would be unattainable in the case of individual paro-
chial schools.65 Second, the Board might have wished to give maxi-
mum bargaining power to a number of very small employee groups.06
Regardless of the actual basis for its bargaining unit decisions, how-
ever, the grounds that the Board gave conflicted with the church's
reading of its own canon law in the Philadelphia and Los Angeles
cases.
The Philadelphia employers introduced evidence to prove that
the pastor has primary responsibility under canon law for the tem-
poral administration and spiritual guidance of an individual parish
school. The bishop acts only in a supervisory capacity, thereby
making the parish, and not the archdiocese, the relevant unit for
certification purposes.
The Board, however, found that "[t]he archbishop, who holds
the supreme legislative, judicial, and persuasive authority in the
Archdiocese, has delegated the responsibility for the supervision of
the schools to the archdiocesan superintendent of schools." 6s In the
area of labor relations, the Board further found that "the Archdio-
cese exercises considerable influence or control." 69
64 See NLRB v. New Enterprise Stone & Lime Co., 413 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.
1969); Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877 (1968).
65 The Board has set a jurisdictional standard which states that the Board will
not exercise jurisdiction unless there are revenues to the employer in excess of $1
million and out of state purchases of over $50,000 in any given year. See Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975); Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975). Many parochial schools do not meet this test
individually and so, in order to justify exercising jurisdiction, the Board must either
depart from its monetary standard, or else group schools under a larger employer.
The bargaining unit will, however, not necessarily be identical to the jurisdictional
unit. In Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 221 N.L.R.B. 831, 832-33 (1975),
for example, the diocese was found to be the appropriate unit for jurisdictional
purposes, but only one elementary school was selected as an appropriate bargaining
unit.
66A number of Roman Catholic elementary schools have no more than one
dozen lay teachers. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 221 N.L.R.B.
831 (1975) (St. Leo's School in Brooklyn involved twelve lay faculty).
67 Brief for Appellees, supra note 53, at 8-9.




A similar claim of religious autonomy was made for the twenty-
six diocesan high schools in Los Angeles.70  Even though the Board
excluded a number of nondiocesan and elementary schools from the
Los Angeles bargaining unit,71 the Archbishop claimed that "the
Board ignored evidence of the autonomy of each school-autonomy
which is mandated and encouraged by Catholic doctrine and the
concept of 'communities of faith.' " Although it may be question-
able constitutionally for the Board to contradict the Church's inter-
pretation of its own canon law regarding the autonomy to be ac-
corded to its schools, 73 the Board's definition of the appropriate
bargaining unit may still be upheld under the "totality of circum-
stances" analysis that it normally employs.74 The problem of who
decides the degree of autonomy, however, remains troubling. The
Board has normally accounted for the factor of autonomy by con-
sidering the centralization of management and the degree of inter-
dependence or autonomy of facilities. In order to strengthen its
case in Philadelphia, the Board relied on the previous bargaining
history of the diocesan high schools, arguing that centralized bar-
gaining in these schools showed that a diocesan-wide bargaining unit
was not inconsistent with Church law.75 Bargaining in the high
schools, however, differs, because the Church made the determina-
tion in this case that a centralized bargaining unit was appropriate,
whereas in the case of the elementary schools, the Board made the
determination. The Board assumed the right to make a determina-
tion concerning the internal structure of the church's school system
thereby unconstitutionally substituting its views for the interpreta-
tion of ecclesiastical authorities 6
This problem does not necessarily preclude the application of
the NLRA to parochial schools. If church law requires that certain
schools must be autonomous, then the Board may properly be lim-
ited to certifying single school bargaining units. Indeed, in its
decision to exercise jurisdiction in the Los Angeles case, the Board
excluded from the unit a number of parish high schools because
70Reply Brief for Petitioners at 20-25, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los
Angeles v. NLRB, No. 77-1286 (9th Cir., appeal docketed Jan. 31, 1977).
71 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1219 (1976).
72Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, at 24-25.
73 See text accompanying notes 119-124 infra.
74 See note 63 supra.
76 Brief for the NLRB at 11, Caulfield v. Hirsch, No. 77-1318 (3d Cir., appeal
docketed March 7, 1977).
76 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)
(doctrinal dispute); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (property dispute).
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these were found to be independent of the central authority of the
archdiocese.77 Perhaps the Board should be required to make even
broader concessions of this sort when claims of religious autonomy
are made against the Board's determination of the appropriate bar-
gaining unit. Such deference might weaken the bargaining power
of the union members, but this would be the price attached to the
protection of first amendment rights.78
b. The Divisiveness of a Lay Teacher Unit
On the issue of the divisiveness that is created by certifying a
bargaining unit composed only of lay teachers, the Philadelphia
pastors argued:
The Catholic school is considered by the church to be a
single community of faith, in which all employees work
commonly for the religious ends for which the schools are
established . . . . The religious play an identical role
with lay persons with respect to school policies; they serve
on the same committees, teach many of the same courses,
carry out the same administrative duties and are expected
to have the same attitudes towards the religious apostolate
of the schools.
79
If the lay teachers were permitted to bargain separately, the
pastors argued, the "single community of faith" might be disrupted
because the working conditions for lay and religious teachers would
differ.8 0 The Caulfield court found this divisiveness argument per-
suasive.8 '
The church's position, however, is not very persuasive here.
The Archdiocese of Philadelphia has been content since 1968 to
77 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1219 (1976).
7 8 This sort of deference, however, may ultimately create its own constitutional
problems, either under the establishment clause, see text accompanying note 133
infra, or as an unconstitutional "entanglement" with religious affairs, see text accom-
panying notes 150-58 infra.
79 Brief for Appellees, supra note 53, at 11-12.
80 None of the parties in the Philadelphia case suggested that the bargaining
unit should be composed of both lay and religious teachers. Archdiocese of Phila-
delphia, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 177 (1977). The possibility of the Board's adjudicating
grievances between the Church and its priests and nuns, against the wishes of the
Church, is incompatible with the first amendment. See McClure v, Salvation Army,
460 F.2d 553, 558-61 (5th Cir. 1972). In any case, the Board has recognized the
potential problems of combining lay and religious teachers in a single bargaining
unit. See Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1973).
81 No. 76-279, slip op. at 27-28.
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bargain separately with its lay high school teachers.82 Although this
bargaining history alone may not be sufficient grounds for forcing
centralized bargaining on the Catholic elementary schools, it pro-
vides a good ground for doubting that lay unions are religiously
divisive. To argue otherwise, the Church must maintain that what
it finds religiously permissible in the high schools is too divisive in
its elementary schools. The Board is still confronted with the neces-
sity of examining the strengths and weaknesses of a doctrinal
claim. Here, however, the claim is truly doubtful given the
Church's own activity at the high school level. Any interference
with religious freedom that is claimed in this instance is almost
certainly minimal and consequently need not be viewed seriously.
2. Unfair labor practice charges
Perhaps the most interesting and difficult issue that the paro-
chial schools have raised regarding potential threats under the
NLRA to their free exercise rights is based on the Board's power
to find that an employer has engaged in conduct inconsistent with
employees' rights under section 7 of the NLRA, which include the
rights to organize, to join a union, to bargain collectively and to
engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection.8 3 Both
the Caulfield court and the Seventh Circuit concluded that there
would be inescapable interferences by the Board in the religious
mission of the parochial schools when the Board attempted to ad-
minister sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, which
define unfair labor practices. The problems inherent in the en-
forcement of each one of these sections will be considered separately.
a. Section 8(a)(1)
Section 8(a)(1) declares that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 1 Among the
activities that have been held to violate section 8(a)(1) is an em-
82 Brief for Intervenor Union at 3-4, Caulfield v. Hirsch, No. 77-1318 (3d Cir.,
appeal docketed March 7, 1977).
83 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
8429 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970). Employer conduct that is violative of the
narrower sections 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(5) is often held to be derivatively violative of
the broader section 8(a)(1). See, e.g., Robertshaw Controls Co. v. NLRB, 386
F.2d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 1967) (conduct that violates 8(a)(3) necessarily violates
8(a)(1)); Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1968) (conduct
that violates 8(a)(5) also violates 8(a)(1)). See R. GomuNr, BASIC TExT ox
LABOR LAw, UNioNrZArION AxD CoLxaLrrvE BARGAININc 132 (1976).
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ployer speech that contains threats of reprisal or promises of benefit
in relation to union activity, or the lack thereof.
The Seventh Circuit discussed one case brought under this sec-
tion in order to substantiate its fears for the free exercise rights of
schools.15 In that case, the employer allegedly made threats of
reprisal for union activity "by reciting... a prayer entitled 'Repent
Ye Sinful Children;' and in reading aloud . . . the General Epistle
of St. James, Chapter 4, Verses 1-10" to a group of employees.
86
Such an accusation may seem frivolous at first impression and in this
case the charge was dismissed, 7 but the underlying issue cannot
be so lightly dismissed.
In one of the cases consolidated under NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 88 an employer repeatedly spoke to his employees to discourage
them from joining a union. Apparently he sincerely believed that
union strikes would put his company out of business due to its
precarious financial position.89 The union lost the representation
election and the Board subsequently found an 8(a)(1) violation.90
In upholding the Board's decision, the Supreme Court drew a line
between legitimate predictions of economic consequences and ille-
gitimate threats of reprisal.91 The Gissel court, however, pointed
to the effect of the speeches on employees and not on the sincere
belief of the employer. The Court suggested that "the Board could
reasonably conclude that the intended and understood import of
[the employer's] message was not to predict that unionization would
inevitably cause the plant to close but to threaten to throw em-
ployees out of work regardless of the economic realities." 92 Never-
theless, the evidence that this effect was intended was conjectural at
best and was subordinated to the concern for what was understood
by the employees. The Gissel case confirms the view that effect is
enough to prove an unfair labor practice under 8(a)(1) and that no
anti-union motive need be shown.
93
85 559 F.2d at 1125-26.
861d.
87 Id.





93 R. GoBmAN, supra note 84, at 132-33; Oberer, The Scienter Factor in
Sections 8(a)(i) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and
Tails, 52 COHN.LL L.Q. 491, 516 (1967).
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If the effect of a speech is to be the controlling factor in decid-
ing whether an 8(a)(1) violation has occurred, the prayers and reci-
tations described might well be considered unfair labor practices.
Furthermore, in Gissel, an 8(a)(1) violation was found despite the
employer's freedom of speech defense.94 This result does nothing to
reassure the parochial school employers that their free exercise claim
will be given serious attention under the usual standards applied to
8(a)(1) questions. There may be, no doubt, occasions when an
employer would abuse the opportunity to make a speech such as the
one described here, but if the employer's sincere belief concerning
the religious import of his employees' conduct is deemed to be irrel-
evant in determining whether an 8(a)(1) violation has taken place,
then the state seems to have encroached on the employer's free exer-
cise rights. The potential for such encroachment indicates that,
at the least, the Board and the courts should fashion an exception
to the Gissel rule for parochial schools that requires a showing of
anti-union motive before a communication with employees on
union issue is declared to be an unfair labor practice. The next
section, however, shows that this alternative has its own difficulties.
b. Section 8(a)(3)
Under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, an employer may not "by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment . . . encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." -5 With respect to the
problems raised by applying this section to parochial schools, the
Seventh Circuit concluded:
We are unable to see how the Board can avoid becoming
entangled in doctrinal matters if, for example, an unfair
labor practice charge followed the dismissal of a teacher
either for teaching a doctrine . . . totally at odds with the
tenets of the Roman Catholic faith, or for adopting a life-
style... contrary to Catholic moral teachings. The Board
in processing an unfair labor practice charge would neces-
sarily have to concern itself with whether the real cause for
discharge was that stated or whether this was merely a pre-
textual reason given to cover a discharge actually directed
at union activity. The scope of this examination would
necessarily include the validity as a part of church doctrine
of the reason given for the discharge. 6
94 395 U.S. at 620.
9529 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
96 559 F.2d at 1125. See No. 76-279, slip op. at 30.
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In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on three 8(a)(3)
charges that had been filed in Indiana. In each of the cases, a
teacher's contract was not renewed, and the employee complained
that this action was taken in retaliation for having engaged in union
activity. In the first case, the reason given by the employer was that
the teacher had exposed biology students to the sexual theories of
Masters and Johnson, which were contrary to the teachings of the
church.07 In the second case, the reason given for nonrenewal was
that the teacher had married a divorced catholic and was no longer
in good standing with the church.98 In the third case, the teacher
was allegedly unwilling to structure a religion course as directed b]'
his superiors.99
The prevailing rule concerning the definition of what consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3) is not altogether
clear. The difficulty arises because under some circumstances, "dis-
crimination ... to encourage or discourage" union activity has been
interpreted to require an antiunion motive or animus, and in
others, to require only an effect that is itself sufficient to encourage
or discourage union activity. 100 The alternatives were presented by
the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.101:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's
discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of im-
portant employee rights, no proof of an antiunion moti-
vation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor
97 Case No. 25-CA-7932-3, NLRB Region 25, Indianapolis, Indiana (filed May
7, 1976).
9sCase No. 25-CA-7932, NLRB Region 25, Indianapolis, Indiana (filed May
4, 1976).
99 Case No. 25-CA-7932-2, NLRB Region 25, Indianapolis, Indiana (filed May
7, 1976).
100 A line of cases dealing with the question of when a showing of antiunion
animus is required to make out a violation of section 8(a)(3) culminated in NLRB
v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). See text accompanying notes
102-12 infra. Previous cases dealing with the question include American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221
(1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & TeL Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Professor Gorman cogently analyzes these
cases and summarizes the existing state of the law under sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3). R. Gonm .x, supra note 84, at 326-338. See generally Christensen and
Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The
Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968); Janofsky,
New Concepts in Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA-The Legacy
of American Ship-Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 CoLms. L. REv. 81 (1970);
Note, Intent, Effect, Purpose, and Motive as Applicable Elements to f 8(a)(1) and
f 8(a)(3) Violations of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 VAKE FoansT L. Rv.
616 (1971).
101 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the
conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second,
if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct . . . is
"comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be
proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come for-
ward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business
justifications for the conduct.
0 2
The first alternative, which does not require a showing of anti-
union animus, essentially takes the position that certain kinds of
employer actions are so devastating in their impact on section 7
rights that the employer's justification may not be heard by the
Board.103 Although the Supreme Court has not yet defined "inher-
ently destructive," some meaning may be conjectured. Inherently
destructive action might be defined as employer action that is in-
explicable by any motivation other than antiunion animus and that
is aimed directly at destroying or undermining the union. A pro-
bative element in distinguishing inherently destructive activity is
likely to be the extent to which the employer's action applies only
to those employees who are union members or union activists, on a
broad, class-wide basis. 04 If the test of inherently destructive action
is so defined, it poses little difficulty for the free exercise rights of
parochial school employers. Because the test is dependent precisely
on the lack of any motivation other than antiunion animus, religious
justifications would not be interfered with because they are not im-
plicated. The three Indiana cases mentioned previously all dealt
with single discharges, which are difficult to classify as inherently
destructive action. These cases are therefore likely to be considered
under the second alternative mentioned in Great Dane Trailers.
Employer action that is comparatively slight in its adverse im-
pact on section 7 rights will require some proof of an antiunion
motive. 05 The implications that the law in this area has for free
exercise are unfortunately clouded by confusion in the law itself.
The difficulty is in interpreting the Great Dane Trailers require-
102 Id. 34.
103 See R. Goasr.us, supra note 84, at 338.
1041d.
105R. Go rAN, supra note 84, at 137-38. Great Dane Trailers requires a
showing of a "legitimate and substantial business justification" before the question
of antiunion animus arises. This may place the Board in the impossible position of
judging what religious claims are "substantial." See text accompanying notes 150-58
infra.
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ment that "an antiunion motivation must -be proved." 106 The
First Circuit has held that the antiunion animus must be "domi-
nant"; 107 the Sixth Circuit that it must be the "actual impelling
motive"; 108 the Third Circuit that it must have "in fact motivated"
the conduct; 109 and the Fifth Circuit that the conduct in question
would not have occurred "but for" the antiunion animus." 0 The
rule which the Seventh Circuit mentioned in Catholic Bishop of
Chicago is derived from a Second Circuit case, NLRB v. Pembeck
Oil Corp.:"' The Pembeck court stated that "although ample valid
grounds may exist for the discharge of an employee, that discharge
will violate § 8(a)(3) if it was in fact motivated, even partially, by
the employee's union activity." 112
The Pembeck Oil rule for determining whether an 8(a)() viola-
tino has occurred is the most problematic for free exercise. On its
face, the rule does not require that antiunion animus must be de-
cisive for the employer's activity to be proscribed. Thus, if anti-
union feeling on the part of the employer partly motivated the
discharge of a teacher, the firing would violate section 8(a)(3) even
though the employee might have been discharged regardless of that
feeling, for legitimate religious reasons. The problem of determin-
ing whether an action that is arguably an 8(a)(3) violation was moti-
vated by antiunion animus or by legitimate religious belief poses
the greatest constitutional difficulties, because this problem requires
an examination of the parochial school employers' religious pur-
poses and the degree to which these purposes act only as a pretext
for discriminatory activity.
In Caulfield v. Hirsch the Regional Director dealt with the
problem by conceding that the Board is precluded from deciding
106 388 U.S. at 34. Professor Gorman puts the problem succinctly: "[I]t is
not necessary that . . . union activities were the sole actuating cause for the dis-
charge or lesser discipline .... although there is no consensus as to what should
be the required quantum of antiunion animus in order to make out a violation."
R. Go_ .A, supra note 84, at 138.
107 NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1312 (1st Cir. 1971).
lo8 NLRB v. Stemun Mfg. Co., 423 F.2d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 1970).
109 NLRB v. Buitoni Foods Corp., 298 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1962). But
see NLRB v. Princeton Inn Co., 424 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1970).
110 NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576, 582 (5th Cir. 1967).
111 404 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds and remanded
sub nom. Atlas Engineering Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 U.S. 828 (1969). See also
NLRB v. Advanced Business Forms Corp., 474 F.2d 457, 463-64 (2d Cir. 1973);
S. A. Healy Co. v. NLRB, 435 F.2d 314, 316 (10th Cir. 1970).
112 404 F.2d at 109, quoted in Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d
1112, 1130 (7th Cir. 1977).
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"matters of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical concern." 113 If the
application of a part of the NLRA to the parochial schools required
the Board to determine whether the employer's religious belief was
a pretext for antiunion activity, the result might be an application
of section 16 of the NLRA:
If any provision of this Act, or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstances, shall be held
invalid, the remainder of this Act, or the application of
such provision to persons or circumstances other than
those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected
thereby., 4
Application of this section provides no real solution to problems
arising under section 8(a)(3). The Board could hardly exercise
jurisdiction but at the same time refrain from determining whether
there has been an unfair labor practice whenever a parochial em-
ployer asserts a religious motive, nor is the Board likely to admit
that such determinations would require it to decide matters of
religious doctrine.
The position taken by the Board in Catholic Bishop of Chicago
is more plausible. The Board, according to its own argument,
would simply be compelled "to try to make some reasonable ac-
commodation to the religious purposes of the school." 115 The
Seventh Circuit was not persuaded by this position:
If as the Board counsel indicated during oral argument in
the present cases, reasonable accommodation would mean
that where the religious question was presented for dis-
charge or failure to hire it would override somehow the
fact that the discharge or failure to hire was also motivated
by antiunion reasons, then it would seem there would be
still other substantial constitutional questions presented.""
In the opinion of the court, an accommodation would still require
the Board to assess the validity of church doctrine. Furthermore,
such an accommodation might well represent an unconstitutional
favoritism to religion. These two objections require further
discussion.
First, the Seventh Circuit argued that in order to convince the
Board of the necessity for an accommodation, the employer would
113 Brief for NLRB, supra note 75, at 16.
114 29 U.S.C. § 166 (1970).
115 559 F.2d at 1128.
116 Id. 1129.
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be compelled in any case to demonstrate to the Board's satisfaction
the validity of the religious justification that has been advanced.'"'
The Seventh Circuit's concern for avoiding state determinations of
doctrinal validity is understandable. Most recently, in Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivoiavich,"8 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed a hundred year old rule that civil courts are not per-
mitted to interfere with "the decisions of the highest judicatories
of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of disci-
pline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule,' customs, or
law. 19
The major cases, however, suggest that free exercise requires
more than a mere prohibition of interference with official church
determinations of doctrine. Certainly the truth of religious doc-
trines may not be questioned. In United States v. Ballard,20 the
Court held that the Constitution precluded the state from con-
sidering the truth of religious claims for the purpose of deciding
whether the defendants had made fraudulent misrepresentations. 2 1
Furthermore, an attempt to determine whether an asserted doc-
trinal claim is in fact religious and consistent with the church
doctrine in question appears to be impermissible. Cantwell v. Con-
11 Id.
11s426 U.S. 696 (1976).
119 Id. 713. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue- Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363
U.S. 190 (1960) (per curiam); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94
(1952).
:12 32,2 U.S. 78 (1944).
121 Id. 86. But cf. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th
Cir. 1977) (en banc), where the court upheld seven to six the findings of a trial
judge that a parochial school's racial segregation policy was unconstitutional even
though the defendant claimed that the policy was a religions one. A plurality of
five judges focussed on the religious beliefs of the school as an institution, rather
than the beliefs of students and their parents, and relied on the absence of written
confirmation of the religious belief and on the Church's admission that the belief
was not immutable. Id. 311-14. Judge Goldberg concurred specially in an opinion
with which Judge Brown concurred in part. Judge Goldberg argued for a broader
definition of religion based on the beliefs of the student and parents. Id. 314-21
(Goldberg, J., concurring). He found the beliefs regarding racial segregation to
be religious beliefs, but concurred with the plurality on the ground that the govern-
ment's compelling interest in desegregation, embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)
and the thirteenth amendment, outweighed the minimal incursion on free exercise
rights. Id. 314, 321-24 (Goldberg, J., concurring specially). Judge Roney wrote
for the six dissenters; he also found that the school's beliefs were sufficiently religious
to mandate first amendment scrutiny, but declined to weigh the interests involved.
He would have remanded for more fact finding on which to base such an analysis.
Id. 324-26 (Roney, J., dissenting). Thus, of the thirteen judges sitting en banc,




necticut 1 held it unconstitutional for state solicitation permits to
turn upon the state's determination that the solicitation was for a
religious cause. In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,123 a state statute designed to
resolve church property disputes was held unconstitutional because
the statute required a civil jury to determine whether the parent
church had substantially departed from an earlier doctrinal posi-
tion. Together, these cases indicate that a judicial determination
of the validity of an asserted religious claim would be judged im-
proper. A court could hardly choose between differing interpreta-
tions of church doctrine without deciding first whether there was a
religious issue at all and second, whether one interpretation was
more consistent with official doctrine than another. Although a
court's proper role in religious matters is limited, all judicial in-
quiry into whether a religious claim is made as a mere pretext is
not foreclosed. Ballard did not reach the question whether an
inquiry into the defendants' good faith might legitimately be
undertaken, but both of the lower courts assumed that such an
inquiry was permissible and the Court said nothing to change this
assumption.
1 24
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the courts and the
Board must take at face value a religious claim asserted in good
faith. The Board may accommodate religious belief, but it cannot
pick and choose among beliefs on the basis of its own determination
of doctrinal validity. Rather the Board must defer to intra-church
claims of validity. This does not mean that the Board must always
allow a religious motive to override a nonreligious one without
considering the relative importance of the two. The solution to
the problem of balancing religious and nonreligious factors depends
upon the degree of accommodation required by the first amend-
ment; this problem is at the heart of the Seventh Circuit's second
objection to the Board's proposed accommodation doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit's second objection to the Board's defer-
ence to assertions of religious motivation was essentially based on
the establishment clause. Judge Sprecher, in a brief concurring
opinion, summarized the argument:
[I]n attempting to steer a course between the Scylla and
Charybdis of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,
[the Board] has collided with one and fallen into the
122 310 U.S. 296, 303-07 (1940).
123 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
124 322 U.S. at 88. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1904).
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other . . . by conceding that (the Free Exercise Clause]
will inexorably force it to "accommodate" and prefer re-
ligious employers and conversely to discriminate against
secular employers in like situations, it will in the con-
stitutional sense "establish" the religions with which it
deals.1'2
The Seventh Circuit was explicitly concerned about an accom-
modation problem that has arisen under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.126 An E.E.O.C. regulation that sought to en-
force the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds obligated an
employer "to make reasonable accommodations to the religious
needs of employees . . . where such accommodations can be made
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's busi-
ness." 127 The Sixth Circuit concluded that this regulation did not
violate the establishment clause in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. 128
The Supreme Court had an opportunity during its last term to con-
sider the issue in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.129  In
Hardison an employee who was discharged for not working on his
sabbath contended that the employer had failed sufficiently to ac-
commodate his religious practices as required by the regulation,
even though the employer and the union had arranged shift trans-
fers and temporary adjustments in work schedules.130 The employer
argued in opposition that any further accommodation would be an
establishment of religion.' 18 The Court did not reach the establish-
ment clause argument because it held that the employer had made
a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances and thus had
not violated the regulation. 132
The contradictory nature of the religion clauses may mean that
any attempt by the state to accommodate free exercise rights will
tend to establish religion in some degree. Moreover, it might be
argued that Board efforts at accommodation present no more of an
establishment threat than the total immunity of parochial schools
125 559 F.2d at 1131 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
12642 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
12729 C.F.R. 1605.1 (1974).
128516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided court, 429 U.S.
65 (1976), vacated and remanded on rehearing, 97 S. Ct. 2965 (1977) (judgment
vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977)).






from the jurisdiction of the NLRA. The Seventh Circuit probably
rejected this argument on the theory that complete noninvolvement
is the command of the establishment clause, even if the religious
groups concerned may benefit, whereas "accommodation" leads to
hopeless entanglement of a state agency in church affairs. 33
At the very least, the establishment clause problem does require
a careful reexamination of the proposed Board accommodation.
There is a reasonable middle ground between the Pembeck Oil rule,
which allows the Board to find unfair labor practices when anti-
union animus partly motivates an employer's conduct, and a rule
that requires complete deference to mere assertions of religious pur-
pose. This is the "but for" rule, applied in NLRB v. Whitfield
Pickle Co. 34 Under this rule, the antiunion motive must be a
necessary condition for the challenged conduct, so that "but for"
the antiunion animus, the conduct would not have occurred.
Such a rule may, indeed, be a more reasonable interpretation
of the language in Great Dane Trailers than is the Pembeck Oil
rule. Furthermore, the "but for" rule preserves the right of free
exercise whenever religious doctrine would have led to the conduct
regardless of antiunion motives. A good example of the manner in
which the rule should be applied is available in Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn.es A teacher at Nazareth Regional High School
was not rehired following a period of intense union activity in
which he was involved. The evidence showed a number of privi-
leged, religious reasons why the teacher might legitimately have
been terminated. These reasons, however, either were ignored-the
teacher had been rehired once in spite of them-or only came to the
attention of the employer after the decision not to rehire the second
time was made. The union activity therefore played the decisive
part in the decision not to rehire. 86
The implementation of such a rule would give considerable
protection to free exercise rights while also preserving labor rights.
Even this rule, however, is not altogether satisfactory. This is illus-
trated in the case just described. If it is true that good religious
133 See text accompanying notes 150-53 infra. "Entanglement" is not clearly
either a "free exercise" or an "establishment" doctrine, but reflects the values pro-
tected by both religion clauses.
134 374 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1967).
135 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 222 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1976).
136 Cf. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86, 90-91 (3d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944) (employer violated section 8(a) (3) by
discharging employee who was involved in union activities but had not previously
been discharged when found derelict in duties).
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grounds for dismissal came to light after the decision to dismiss was
actually made, and that these grounds would have led to discharge
independent of the union activity, then a Board order to reinstate
such a teacher would interfere with the right to discharge on those
grounds. If the parochial employer must wait to discharge the
teacher, it is required by law to employ as a teacher one whom might
be described as a heretic. It is perhaps unavoidable, then, that ap-
plication of section 8(a)(3) to parochial school employers will raise
serious free exercise questions.
c. Section 8(a)(5)
The last kind of unfair labor practice that raises potential free
exercise problems involves the employer's refusal "to bargain col-
lectively with the representatives of his employees." 137 Section
8(a)(5) places an employer under the obligation to bargain in good
faith with his employees regarding the terms and conditions of
employment. 138 At first glance, this section seems to present no
threat to parochial employers. The difficulty is that there are cer-
tain mandatory subjects of bargaining, which the parties are obli-
gated to discuss, if raised. 39 Furthermore, the use of economic force
such as strikes and lockouts is permissible to win concessions on
mandatory subjects of bargaining, if bargaining proceeds to im-
passe. 140 If a parochial school employer chose for religious reasons
to shorten the work day 141 or to replace lay teachers with religious-
order teachers, 142 these decisions would involve mandatory subjects
of bargaining. The former case involves a question of hours and is
therefore explicitly within the statute. The latter case is analogous
to the question of sub-contracting, which has been held to be a
mandatory subject of bargaining.'4 3 Consequently, the employer is
13729 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
138 The meaning of the term "good faith" is found in 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1970).
139 See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964);
NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
140 NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
141 In Los Angeles, a teacher complained that an employer had "implemented
[a] plan to cut back the number of class periods in the school day . . . from eight
. . . to seven . . . in order to discourage lay teachers . . . from engaging in
union . . . activities." Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint, and
Notice of Hearing, Nos. 21-CA-13600, 21-CA-13885, 21-CA-14012, NLRB Region
21, Los Angeles, California (March 4, 1976) reprinted in Reply Brief for Petitioners,
supra note 70, at 9-10 (appendix).
142 See 559 F.2d at 1123-24.
143 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLBB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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required by the statute to discuss these changes with the union; if a
strike ensued, it would be protected. The employer might, on the
other hand, consider the changes to implicate religious questions.
Shorter hours might be needed in order to give students more time
for religious activities and clerical teachers might be given job prior-
ity because the Church felt obligated towards them or believed that
their religious training had uniquely prepared them to communicate
the values of the church. As a result, the employer might refuse to
bargain about these religious subjects, not wishing to give an im-
pression of flexibility or lack of authority in them. Indeed, a reli-
gious employer might also wish to discharge any person who opposed
his authority in this regard. According to the Seventh Circuit, "un-
der eccelesiastical law he would have the right if not the duty to
take that action." 144 As the Caulfield court put it, the "crux of the
problem is that the 'terms and conditions' of employment at some
point become inseparable from the religious mission of the Church
schools." 145
The dangers of interference with the free exercise of the em-
ployers' religious mission in this regard were not ignored by the
union and the Board in Caulfield. The union was prepared to
admit that "the parties would be precluded from bargaining over
strictly religious issues with the Church," 146 and the Regional
Director stated:
[T]he Board may decide, in the proper case and upon a
proper factual background, whether bargaining on a par-
ticular subject is mandatory, permissible, or impermissible,
and in so doing may take into account the peculiar circum-
stances of an employer's operations, and may protect the
employer from a union's attempt to compel bargaining re-
garding an improper subject.
147
Such responses, however, merely skirt the inevitable free
exercise problems that arise when the Board attempts to decide
which issues are religious enough to merit a waiver from the bar-
gaining requirement. The same two unavoidable and interrelated
problems that were discussed with respect to 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)
violations also arise under section 8(a)(5). First, the Board would
be forced to decide whether the church employer's objections to
144 559 F.2d at 1124.
145 No. 76-279, slip op. at 29.
14 6 Brief for Intervenor Union at 36, supra note 82.
147 Brief for NLBB at 11, supra note 75.
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bargaining were actually religiously based. Second, the Board
would have to determine whether the religious doctrine relied upon
by the church employer actually applied to the labor relations
problem under consideration. In the opinion of the Caulfield
court, if the Board were to decide these questions, "it would be
faced with the insuperable task of separating that which is secular
from that which is religious in order to determine what is appro-
priate for bargaining;" 148 in addition, the employers would be
denied the free exercise of "their belief that they must have exclu-
sive authority . . . to maintain the integrity of the mission of the
schools." 149
In order to avoid conflict with the free exercise clause, the
church must be given the right to determine the subjects of bar-
gaining as well as the doctrinal grounds that will justify the refusal
to bargain. Such deference to an employer's position is unprece-
dented under the NLRA and may totally undermine its efficacy.
3. Entanglement and Chilling
Both the Caulfield court and the Seventh Circuit relied on a
more general sort of argument that focuses upon the potential for
infringement of free exercise when the Board's exercise of juris-
diction entangles it with the administration of parochial schools
in each of the areas discussed above. 180 The entanglement doctrine
was first formulated by the Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Com-
mission,'51 where the Court stated that legislation which did not
sponsor or support religion might still violate the establishment
clause if the legislation required "official and continuing surveil-
lance" of church activities by the government, as in an administra-
tive relationship for the enforcement of statutory standards.
152
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,:5 the Court struck down state laws
that attempted to give public aid to parochial schools, in part be-
cause "[t]his kind of state inspection and evaluation of the religious
content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of en-
tanglement that the Constitution forbids. It is a relationship
pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church
schools and hence of churches." 154
148 No. 76-279, slip op. at 29.
149 Id.
150 See 559 F.2d at 1126; No. 76-279, slip op. at 30.
151397 U.S. 664 (1970).
152 Id. 675.




Although the entanglement doctrine arose in the context of
establishment clause cases like Walz and Lemon, it clearly extends
into the area of free exercise. In his concurring opinion in Lemon,
Justice Douglas stated:
The intrusion of government into religious schools
through grants, supervision, or surveillance may result in
establishment of religion . . . . Those activities of the
State may also intrude on the Free Exercise Clause by de-
priving a teacher, under threats of reprisals, of the right
to give sectarian construction or interpretation . . or to
... inculcate religious creed or dogma.155
To the entanglement argument, the Seventh Circuit added that
Board jurisdiction will chill the free religious activities of parochial
school pastors, because they may forego their rights in order "'to
steer far wider of the unlawful zone' of impermissible conduct." 156
The entanglement and chilling arguments possess a certain
force when taken together with the more specific possibilities for
conflict between the NLRA and the free exercise clause that have
already been discussed.167 Although there may be no reason in
155 Id. 634 (Douglas, J., concurring).
156 559 F.2d at 1124 (citation omitted).
157 In addition to the problems under sections 8 and 9 of the NLBA, the
Board's investigatory powers, which are detailed in section 11, may impinge on the
parochial school employers' free exercise to the extent that the investigatory power
assists in establishing the basis for unfair labor practice charges. The Board has
two avenues through which it can gather and disclose information possessed by the
employer. First, the NLRA gives the Board wide power under section 11, 29
U.S.C. § 161 (1970), to make investigations in its processing of representation
petitions and unfair labor practice charges. Section 11 provides in relevant part:
(1) The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all
reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the
right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded
against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. The
Board, or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party to such
proceedings, forthwith issue to such party subpoenas requiring the attend-
ance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such
proceeding or investigation requested in such application.
29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1970).
The Board's power to subpoena documents has been construed liberally. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (the Board can require
employers to furnish employees' names and addresses in election cases through its
subpoena power, for these lists are evidence within the meaning of section 11(1)).
The Board has also promulgated Statements of Procedures, and Rules and
Regulations, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101-03 (1976), pursuant to section 6 of the Act,
which: 1) provide, in unfair labor practice cases under section 10(a) to (i) of the
NLRA, for field staff investigation, 29 C.F.R. § 101.4, depositions, 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.30, subpoenas, 29 C.F.R. § 102.31, and hearings, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.10 & 102.34
to .44; 2) provide, in representation cases under section 9(c) of the NLRA and
petitions for clarification of bargaining units and for amendment of certifications
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principle why the Board and the courts could not carefully tailor
the Board's jurisdiction to protect first amendment rights, such a
process is not necessarily benign in practice and may be costly, both
financially and psychologically, for the free exercise of the religious
mission of the schools. 158 An examination of these conflicts be-
tween the requirements of the NLRA and the free exercise clause
clearly indicates genuine free exercise concerns. For this reason,
it is necessary to reach the third step of the constitutional analysis
and ask if some compelling state interest does not justify the over-
riding of the employer's free exercise claims.
C. An Assessment of the Parochial Schools' Free Exercise Rights in
Light of the Government's Interest in Enforcing the NLRA
The third step of the constitutional analysis requires a serious
consideration of the interests at stake under the NLRA in order to
determine whether they are of sufficient magnitude to override the
interest claiming protection under the free exercise clause. This in-
quiry necessitates an examination of the nature of both the em-
ployers' free exercise rights and the government's interest, and the
application of a test that will determine which of the two competing
interests will prevail.
1. The Nature of the Free Exercise Claim
In Caulfield, individual pastors sought injunctive relief under
the theory that their right to operate the parish schools in conform-
under section 9(b) of the NLRA, for field staff investigation, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18,
subpoenas, 29 C.F.R. § 102.66 & 102.69 and hearings, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.20, 102.63,
102.64 & 102.69; 3) provide, in unfair labor practice and representation cases under
sections 8(b)(7) and 9(c) of the NLRA, for field staff investigation, 29 C.F.R.
9§ 101.22 & 101.23, 29 C.F.R. § 102.77, and hearings, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.23 & 102.77.
The second avenue available to the Board is its power to remedy violations of
section 8(a) (5), which prescribes a duty to bargain in good faith. The Supreme
Court has held that the Board may find a lack of good faith bargaining in an
employer's refusal to disclose relevant financial information to the employees' repre-
sentative, when the employer justifies a refusal to increase benefits on the basis of
financial straits. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956). The
duty to disclose extends past the period of contract negotiation into that of labor-
management relations in general. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432,
435-36 (1967). Although the NLRB can force disclosure, it cannot use this infor-
mation to affect the substantive terms of negotiations. See H. K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
18 Discussing the eventual dismissal of the charge brought against one em-
ployer for reading a prayer entitled "Repent Ye Sinful Children," see text accom-
panying notes 86-87 supra, the Seventh Circuit in Catholic Bishop of Chicago
observed that "the charge was dismissed only after three days of testimony and
531 pages of transcript. We agree with the employers that such a dismissal does
very little to establish the Board's sensitivity to the principles of the Religion
Clauses." 559 F.2d at 1126.
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ity with the moral dictates of Roman Catholicism would be im-
paired by the supervision of the Board. The pastors in Caulfield
as well as the bishops in Catholic Bishop of Chicago and Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles have claimed that the Roman
Catholic church as an institution is harmed by the Board's exten-
sion of jurisdiction because the church may be impaired in its
ability to operate its schools in a manner consistent with its own
religious teachings. 159 The fact that an institutional harm is po-
tentially involved in the parochial school teacher cases complicates
the consideration of the rights involved. This is largely because the
direct impact on any one individual's free exercise rights may be
dissipated as the harm filters through the institutional structure.160
Such an institutional impact might be construed as only an "indi-
rect" interference with free exercise, and thus not deserving of
sanction.
In Braunfeld v. Brown,"6 the interference of Sunday Closing
Laws with the free exercise of Jewish merchants who felt obliged to
observe a Saturday sabbath was found to be so indirect as not to
require any compelling state justification. There are several reasons
why this depiction of the free exercise interest is unsatisfactory here.
In the first place, the relative directness of governmental inter-
ference is not a helpful standard for decision and has been justly
criticized.162 Indeed, in Sherbert v. Verner, 63 an interference seem-
ingly as indirect as that allowed in Braunfeld was found to violate
free exercise. In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a South Carolina statute that denied the plaintiff unemployment
benefits when she was discharged for observing a Saturday sabbath.
6 4
156 See 559 F.2d at 1122-23; No. 76-279, slip op. at 26-30.
3600Unlike many of the free exercise cases that have been decided by the
Supreme Court, the parochial school teacher cases do not squarely involve a con-
frontation between an "individual conscience" and the state. The extension of
Board jurisdiction to the parochial schools does not itself conflict with religious
beliefs; the individual students, teachers and pastors would continue to transmit and
receive a religious education even if they were subject to the NLBA. The insti-
tutional impact is relevant, however, because the schools as institutions provide the
environment where religious studies may be pursued. To the extent that the insti-
tution's functions are impaired, individual rights are affected. See text accompany-
ing notes 166-68 infra.
161 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
162 See id. 616 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment, Religious Rights of the
Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 812., 849-50 [hereinafter cited as Religious Rights];
Comment, Religious Accommodation Under Sherbert v. Verner: The Common Sense
of the Matter, 10 Vmr. L. 1kv. 337, 345 (1965).
163347 U.S. 398 (1963).
164 Id.
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But even if the "directness" test is used, the interference in the
parochial school cases is not of the indirect sort involved in either
Braunfeld or Sherbert. Here, no question is raised of the govern-
ment's action leading to a loss of certain benefits for the person
"exercising" religion.165 Rather, the government would be in the
position of issuing direct orders if the employer's conduct is found
to constitute an unfair labor practice.
Furthermore, the total effect of the Board's extension of juris-
diction over the parochial schools is arguably more severe precisely
because the entire institution is affected. The impairment of the
operation of the parochial schools in a manner consistent with their
religious teachings interferes first with the rights of parents to pro-
vide a religiously oriented education for their children.166 The
pastors and bishops who are claiming an interference with their
ability to administer the schools are also asserting, in effect, their
own free exercise interest in communicating religious values through
education. The positions of both the parents and the parochial
school employers are analogous to that of the Amish parents in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,167 where the Supreme Court upheld the parents'
right to instruct their children in attitudes that were consistent with
the Amish religion. One of the considerations that the Yoder Court
stressed in its opinion was the institutional harm that might result
if Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law was enforced against the
Amish: compulsory school attendance might "ultimately result in
the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as it
exists in the United States today." 168 Certainly, if the application
of the NLRA impairs the Roman Catholic church's ability to in-
culcate its values through its educational system, its continuing
vitality may be diminished. The combination of the institutional
harm and the directness of the government's interference in free
exercise rights therefore adds up to a genuine free exercise claim-
substantial, constitutionally protected, interests of the parochial
school employers.
165 Cf., e.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974)
(residency requirement for free nonemergency medical care found to penalize right
to travel); Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (state's refusal to waive
court fees for indigents penalized right of access to the courts).
166 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).




2. The Nature of the State Interest
The state interest asserted in the parochial school teachers cases
is that of enforcing the policy of the NLRA, which has been aptly
summarized by Professor Gorman: "The statute can best be under-
stood as an effort by the Congress to create the conditions of indus-
trial peace in interstate commerce by removing obstacles to-indeed,
encourage-the formation of labor unions as an effective voice for
the individual worker." 169 The NLRA seeks to achieve industrial
peace by "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protec-
tion." 170 The labor rights thus recognized have even been incor-
porated into the bills of rights of several state constitutions. 71 If the
NLRA is found to be inapplicable to the parochial teachers, the
withdrawal of governmental protection cannot help but impair the
exercise of important social rights, because a forum for redressing
violations of these rights will be unavailable. The lay teachers
would then be forced either to accept the terms and conditions
offered by the employer, with whatever collective bargaining rights
the employer chose to concede, or to seek employment elsewhere.
Although a triumph for the employers' free exercise interest
will hardly undermine the NLRA as a whole, it will entirely exclude
a group of employees from its benefits. Even if such an exclusion
would not obviously conflict with the congressional will, -7 2 the
interest of the employees in the protection of the Act is clearly an
important and substantial one. Absent a new interpretation of the
reach of the NLRA, the interest of these employees should be as
respected as those of any other employees covered by the Act.
3. The Constitutional Standard
There remains the difficult task of determining whether the
state interest in protecting parochial school teachers under the
NLRA is sufficient to justify the interference with free exercise that
would result from the Board's extension of jurisdiction to the
parochial schools. In cases where the Supreme Court has found an
169 R. Gom4Ax, supra note 84, at 1.
17029 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
171 See, e.g., N.Y. CONSr. art. 1, § 17; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
1
7
2 See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
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infringement of free exercise rights, it has asserted that the interest
in religious freedom may be outweighed only by a compelling state
interest 178 or by "interests of the highest order." 174 The difficulty
that the government has had in demonstrating a compelling interest
in such cases clearly indicates that the burden upon the government
is very substantial. 175 This is not surprising, in light of the fact that
"[t]he violation of a man's [religious] conscience often works an
exceptional harm that, unless compellingly justified, amounts to 'a
moral wrong in and of itself.' "176
The cases in the area of labor law where a putative free exercise
claim was overridden by a government interest can be roughly
divided into two groups: 1) those cases where the infringement on
free exercise was so marginal that the government was able to
demonstrate something less than a compelling interest to justify its
action; 177 2) those cases where the infringement on free exercise was
real and substantial but was outweighed by a truly compelling state
interest.17 The division of the cases in this manner underlines the
fact that the compelling interest test becomes more like an ad hoc
balancing test when applied to minor incursions on the freedom
of religion.179 Therefore, the high level of justification that is de-
manded by the compelling interest test is mitigated if the govern-
ment can show that its interest is relatively substantial compared to
the insignificant free exercise claim that is asserted.
The Caulfield court conceded that certain encroachments on
the free exercise of religion such as "fire inspections [and] building
and zoning regulations," are permissible.8 0 These forms of gov-
ernment regulation simply do not involve a cognizable right of free
exercise, unless the institution affected asserts that it adheres to a
religious principle prohibiting such inspections.'8 . Even if the
freedom of religion is tangentially burdened by the fact that ad-
ministrative inspections represent a kind of tax on free exercise,
173 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See Religious Rights, supra
note 162, at 850-56.
17 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
175 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
176 Religious Rights, supra note 162, at 853.
177 See text accompanying notes 180-86 infra.
17 8 See text accompanying notes 191-9.01 infra.
179 See Religious Rights, supra note 162, at 859-61.
3so No. 76-267, slip op. at 32.
81 See note 121 supra.
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the interference is sufficiently minor in comparison to the safety
interests asserted by the government that the state interest should
prevail, without necessarily inquiring into whether these interests
rise to the level of "compelling." The cases where the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) 182 has been upheld against free exercise
claims are analogous to the problem of administrative inspections,
although they provide an example of government regulation that
may have more serious economic consequences for religious insti-
tutions. In Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church,83 a religious
printing business failed in its attempt to avoid the minimum wage
provisions of the Act, even though it asserted that the FLSA in-
fringed on its religious beliefs. The court answered that religious
groups are not free from the financial burdens of government and
that the relatively small burden imposed by the Act was over-
balanced by the state interest in guaranteeing a minimum standard
of living among workers.' 8 Similarly, in Marshall v. Pacific Union
Conference of Seventh Day Adventists,8 5 the equal pay provisions
of the FLSA were held to be constitutional as applied to several
educational institutions operated by the Seventh Day Adventists in
California. The free exercise claim was, however, limited by the
fact that the church apparently favors equal pay as a doctrinal
matter.83
A somewhat more difficult case is presented by Prince v.
Massachusetts,8 7 which is not easily classified as a case where the
government's intrusion into free exercise was minor as opposed to
substantial and direct. In Prince, the Supreme Court upheld the
defendant's conviction under the Massachusetts child labor laws for
permitting her nine-year old daughter to sell religious literature on
the street. The law's impact on free exercise was mitigated by two
factors. First, the right that the defendant asserted was her right to
permit her daughter to sell religious literature; neither the daughter
nor her mother asserted a right on their own behalves to sell such
literature.' Second, the statute forbade the sale of religious
literature by a child but did not prohibit the child from distribut-
18229 U.S.C. §201 (1970).
183210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954).
184 Id. 884-85.
185 No. CV 75-3032-R (C.D. Cal., ified March 23, 1977).
186 Id. slip op. at 4-5.
187321 U.S. 158 (1944).
1s8 Id. 164-65.
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ing it free of charge. 8 9 In addition, the state asserted a strong
interest in its role as parens patriae with respect to the child. 90 In
light of the oblique interference with free exercise, if a free exercise
claim was really involved at all, the state's interest in child welfare
was deemed to prevail.
The parochial school teacher cases do not fit into the line of
analysis applied in cases like Mitchell, Marshall and Prince because
the NLRA does not intrude on the freedom of religion as minimally
as the FLSA or the child labor laws. None of these statutes con-
templates the broad regulatory framework that is established by
the NLRA. The detailed proscriptions and adjudicative processes
necessary to regulate collective bargaining are simply not germane
to the issues of minimum and equal wages or of the protection of
child workers. Because the Board's scrutiny of the parochial
schools' operations may directly and substantially infringe on free
exercise, it is appropriate to examine those cases where claims of
free exercise have been overridden by a compelling interest in the
application of the labor law.
Several cases have arisen where persons or institutions alleged
that the government, under the authority of the labor laws, has
forced them to undertake an action that is directly contrary to their
religious principles. Typically these cases involve claims by parties
that they are religiously proscribed from joining or dealing with a
union. In Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB,' 91 the operators of con-
valescent homes that were funded by the Seventh Day Adventists
refused to bargain with a union certified by the Board on the
grounds that "it was the teaching of the Church and the religious
belief of the Employers that it was wrong to have anything to do
with a labor union." 192 The employers particularly stressed that
the NLRA's requirement of good faith bargaining would compel
them to alter their religious belief that they should not bargain
with a union, but the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that
a belief in the propriety of bargaining was not required by the
NLRA. According to the District of Columbia Circuit, the NLRA
requires no more than the conduct of negotiation, bargaining, and
contracting.193 Although this analysis seems to minimize the inter-
189 Id. 160-61.
190 Id. 166.





ference with free exercise, the court went on to conclude that the
employers' free exercise claim was overridden by the "compelling
public interest in applying the good faith bargaining requirement
uniformly to all employers and labor unions." 104
Issues similar to those raised in Cap Santa Vue were also con-
sidered in CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Local 2548, United Textile
Workers,195 and Linscott v. Millers Falls Co. 19 6 In CIBA, the em-
ployer sought to institute a seven day work week for certain em-
ployees; the union refused to arbitrate the issue, claiming that the
employer's action was in violation of the free exercise clause.197
After addressing the question whether the employer's action con-
stituted state action for the purposes of the first amendment, the
District Court for the District of Rhode Island concluded that the
employers' action was not unconstitutional. This conclusion was
based on a two part analysis. First, the court stated that the ad-
verse impact on free exercise rights was mitigated by the fact that
the employees had the option to work with CIBA and forego ob-
serving a sabbath or to work elsewhere and observe a sabbath.1 8
Second, the court asserted that any infringement on the employees'
free exercise rights was outweighed by the compelling interest of
preserving the system of collective bargaining and industrial
peace.199 In Linscott, a Seventh Day Adventist refused to join the
union under a union shop agreement, which is authorized by the
NLRA, because her religion forebade union membership; she was
subsequently discharged. The First Circuit upheld the discharge
on two grounds, echoing the reasoning followed by the court in
CIBA. The employee had the option to work in a nonunion
shop, so that the union shop agreement did not compel her to sub-
scribe to any religious doctrine to which she was opposed.20 0  In
addition, there were, the court asserted, compelling interests in the
uniform application of the NLRA's union security provision.
201
The reasoning of these decisions is vulnerable on several
grounds. The attempt to minimize the impact on the free exer-
cise rights of the union in CIBA and the individual employee in
194 Id. 890.
'95 391 F. Supp. 287 (D.R.I. 1975).
196 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971).
'97 391 F. Supp. at 289-92.
198 Id. 299-300.
199 Id. 300-01.
200 440 F.2d at 18.
201 Id.
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Linscott by asserting that they had the options to find another job
is at odds with the Supreme Court's analysis in Sherbert v. Verner.
In Sherbert, the crux of the holding was that the state may not
penalize the exercise of the freedom of religion, even if the state
does not explicitly proscribe a belief or thrust a belief upon a per-
son.20 2 The plaintiff in Sherbert surely had the option to seek
employment in another company that observed a Saturday sab-
bath, but this possibility did not affect that Court's holding that
the plaintiff's free exercise rights were infringed. The second
problem with the decisions in CIBA and Linscott is that the courts
never explained why the countervailing interests were compelling,
because they did not analyze how the undoubtedly substantial in-
terests in industrial peace would be undermined if union members
were exempt from Sunday labor in CIBA's chemical plant or if
Mrs. Linscott were permitted to reject union membership. Per-
haps it was the difficulty in articulating why these interests were
compelling that led the courts to downplay the impact of the
employers' actions on free exercise and thereby to bring the cases
within the ambit of the balancing test discussed previously.
The parochial school teacher cases are distinguishable from
CIBA and Linscott in several respects, even if these cases were cor-
rectly decided. The parochial schools' only option other than
submitting to the Board's jurisdiction is to close. They have no
possibility of going elsewhere. 20 3 Therefore, the government's inter-
ference in their first amendment rights is more devastating than in
either CIBA or Linscott. In addition, the weighing of interests in
the parochial school teacher cases is more difficult because the insti-
tutional harms that have already been discussed differ from the more
individual harms that were evaluated in CIBA and Linscott. It is
significant that the Supreme Court has rarely found a compelling
state interest to justify an infringement upon the freedom of re-
ligion.20 4 The courts in CIBA and Linscott may in fact have ap-
plied an ad hoc balancing test in order to avoid the rigors of the
compelling interest test; but the facts presented in Caulfield and
Catholic Bishop of Chicago call for the application of a true com-
202 374 U.S. at 405-06.
203 See Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 139 (1964). But
cf. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (complete
shutdown of an operation, even if motivated by antiunion animus, is not an unfair
labor practice).
204 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which appears to be
the only case where the Supreme Court has found a compelling interest to justify
a racial classification or an infringement upon a "fundamental right."
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pelling interest test. In light of the broad institutional harms that
would be inflicted on the parochial schools and the less than com-
pelling interests presented by the state, when such interests are
scrutinized honestly, the compelling interest test is not met by the
government and the parochial schools should prevail.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has applied a three step constitutional analysis
to the problem of applying the National Labor Relations Act to
parochial schools. It has been argued first, that these schools are an
exercise of legitimate religious beliefs; second, that there are con-
ficts with the religious freedom of the schools caused by applying
sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5) and 9(c) of the NLRA to the parochial
schools; third, that the interests protected by the NLRA are not
sufficiently compelling to override the religious freedom of the
schools.
In arriving at these conclusions, an attempt has been made to
examine the possibility of the Board's exercising jurisdiction in a
way consistent with the parochial employers' free exercise of re-
ligion, through a series of accommodations. Although such accom-
modations, if made, would go a long way towards minimizing many
of the free exercise claims raised, they would remain constitutionally
unsatisfactory in two respects. First, there would be interferences
which would remain even after reasonable accommodations were
made, and these interferences do not seem justifiable. Second, the
accommodations thus made in order to minimize the interference
seem themselves to seriously undermine the purposes of the NLRA.
These features both indicate that the only constitutionally sound
result is that the NLRA should not be applied to parochial school
teacher unions.
Such a conclusion is a hard answer to a difficult problem. No
one would suggest that the employees in these cases would not be
hurt by being denied the protection of the NLRA. But the con-
stitution does afford special protection to religious freedoms; and it
is the conclusion of this Comment that these freedoms cannot be
sufficiently protected if the NLRA is applied in this context.
Given such a conclusion, the limits of the arguments made in
this Comment must be emphasized. Parochial schools, although
many in number, are a very special phenomenon. There may be no
objection to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over any other
parochial commercial activity, provided the nature of that activity
does not call for constant scrutiny by the Board of the religiously
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based decisions made by the employer in his relations with his
employees.
The National Labor Relations Act, like the parochial schools
themselves, is also a very special phenomenon. The Act is an
attempt to set up a system of self-government within the industrial
structure, requiring constant monitoring and adjudication of dis-
putes between private parties. It has been argued earlier, for
example, that the application of an act such as the Fair Labor
Standards Act does not entail nearly the same kind of intrusion into
otherwise private judgments as does the application of the NLRA.
Were it shown, however, that the application of that Act interfered
with sincerely held religious beliefs concerning minimum or equal
pay requirements the reasoning of this Comment does not neces-
sarily require that such interference must be prohibited. The state
interest in ensuring minimal working standards and wage pro-
tection may well be more compelling than the interest in super-
vising the process by which greater than the minima are obtained
through collective bargaining.
In short, the facts of the parochial school teacher cases may be
sufficiently unique so that the arguments offered here apply nowhere
else. The uniqueness of the cases, however, does not diminish the
importance of the first amendment rights asserted by the parochial
school employers. If the employers were compelled to sacrifice their
free exercise interests, the constitutional harms would be consider-
able. For that reason, the requirements of the NLRA must in this
case bend to the dictates of the free exercise clause.
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